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Introduction
In the broad sweep of patent litigation policy, two en banc
decisions by the Federal Circuit in 1995 will likely have an historic
impact on the role of juries in protecting America's intellectual
property. The Supreme Court's decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.,' affirming the en banc opinion of the Federal Circuit,
restricts jury discretion by withdrawing claim construction from the
jury. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.2 will enlarge
it, even if only slightly, under the doctrine of equivalents. This article
considers the latter decision and its implications for patent
infringement cases.
Prior to 1982, district court judgments in patent cases were
appealed to the various regional United States courts of appeals.
Several circuit courts were inhospitable toward infringement cases.3
By the early 1980s, many practitioners and scholars complained that
the circuits not only applied patent law inconsistenly, but also tended
to rule against patent holders4 In 1982, in an effort to bring uniformity
to patent law, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. The court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from all final
federal district court decisions relating to patents.5 The Federal Circuit
has had a far greater tendency to find patents valid than did the
various circuits as a whole.6
1. 116 S.Ct. 1384 (1996), affg 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Markman held that the
interpretation and construction of patent claims are matters of law for the court, not the jury, to
decide.
2. 62 F.3d 1512, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
3. One study showed that the various courts of appeals upheld only 30% of district court
decisions finding patents valid. Ludwig E. Kolman & Thomas L. Duston, In Patent Litigation,
Can Teamwork Work? Patent Lawyers and Litigators Seek Harmony, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 1994, at
S14.
4. See The Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, 84 F.R.D. 429, 469, 473-77 (1979) (transcript of proceedings). See also Richard D.
Harmon, Patent & Copyright Law, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 453, 453 (1980) (explaining that in
1979 the Ninth Circuit held six out of six patents it reviewed invalid). One patent attorney
estimates that when the Ninth Circuit considered patents on appeal, it invalidated as many as
80% of such patents. Anthony Aarons, Pro-Patent Court Makes Practice Profitable, L.A. DAILY
J., Nov. 23, 1992, at 26.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994).
6. According to one study, between 1982 and 1987, the Federal Circuit affirmed district
court decisions finding patents valid 89% of the time. See Kolman & Duston, supra note 3, at
S15.
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The creation of the Federal Circuit, with its pro-patent
orientation, led to a boom in patent litigation. By 1994, the number of
new patent cases had almost doubled over 1981 (795 to 1407). The
new regime found ready support among juries, provoking substantial
criticism. Some actually believe that juries are biased in favor of patent
holders. A few staggering awards have in fact been made, including a
$1.2 billion damages award to Litton Systems, Inc. against Honeywell,
Inc.7 and a $208 million award to Alpex Computer Corporation
against Nintendo Company.8 Not only has the number of patent cases
filed increased, but the percentage tried by juries has increased as well.
In 1981, only twenty percent of patent infringement cases were tried
by juries. By 1988, this percentage had risen to fifty percent.9
The increasing demand for juries to decide scientific issues of ever
increasing complexity led to a backlash. A 1994 survey revealed that
nearly four out of ten patent attorneys thought that juries were not
deciding patent cases correctly.' ° Some of the criticisms were:
The average jury, it was claimed, is not capable of understanding the
complex technology involved in most patent infringement cases.
The risks of litigation and unpredictable jury awards pressure
defendants into paying too much to settle weak cases.
n
Juries are more likely than judges to find that a patent is valid
simply because the patent office decided to issue the patent.1
7. A federal district court later ruled that there was no evidentiary basis for the jury's $1.2
billion award to Litton and granted Honeywell a new trial on the issue of damages. Litton
Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., Nos. CV 90-93 MRP, CV 90-4823 MRP, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
729, at *175, *178 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9,1995).
8. See Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 34 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1167
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1994).
9. Aarons, supra note 4, at 28. See George M. Sirilla, G. Paul Edgell, and Adam R. Hess,
The Advice of Counsel: Defense to Increased Patent Damages, 74J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
705, 727 (1992) (includes statistics).
10. Victor G. Savikas and Marsha E. Durko, Survey of Patent Lawyers Reveals Their
Opinions of Judges and Litigation, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 31, 1994, at C38. The article describing this
survey did not state what percentage of attorneys thought that juries reached the correct result.
11. Fourth Biennial Patent System Major Problems Conference, 34 J.L. & TECH. 67, 88
(1994) [hereinafter Conference] (statement of William S. Thompson).
12. Aarons, supra note 4, at 26 (opinion of Thomas Smegal, patent attorney with Graham &
James).
19961 Hilton Davis AND JURY TRIALS
Jurors are more likely than judges to be influenced by irrelevant
issues, such as the fact that the plaintiff is an individual or small
business, while the defendant is a large corporation. 13 Juries may
also favor domestic patent-holders over foreign corporations
accused of infringement. 14
Juries are less accountable than judges because juries need not
support their decisions with statements of reasons. 15 This problem
can be mitigated, however, through the use of special
interrogatories.
Thus, the Federal Circuit's sua sponte orders that Hilton Davis
and Markman be decided en banc came in the midst of much debate
and criticism regarding the use of juries in patent infringement cases.
The en banc proceedings provoked a groundswell of anticipation that
the Federal Circuit would do something to respond to criticism of jury
trials in patent infringement cases.
I
The Doctrine of Equivalents and Hilton Davis
The doctrine of equivalents has been a particularly sore subject
among critics of patent infringement jury trials. If the patent-holder
cannot prove literal infringement, i.e., that the accused device contains
an exact embodiment of every element set forth in the claims of a
patent, the holder has a second bite at the apple under the doctrine of
equivalents. Prior to Hilton Davis, the doctrine of equivalents was
generally thought to hold that an accused device infringes if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to achieve substantially the same overall result as the claimed
invention. 6 The patent owner bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that every element of the claims, or its
substantial equivalent, is present in the accused device.'
7
The doctrine of equivalents has favored plaintiffs in jury trials in
subtle ways beyond the substance of the doctrine itself. First, the very
name assists plaintiffs. Instructions typically tell juries that there are
13. Conference, supra note 11, at 87-88 (statement of Richard C. Witte).
14. Kolman & Duston, supra note 3, at S16 (citation omitted).
15. Patent Cases: Courtroom No Place for a Jury?, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 18, 1995, at G1.
16. Graver Tank Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950);
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929).
17. See generally ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 6.3 (3d ed. 1994).
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two types of infringement-"literal" infringement and infringement
under the "doctrine of equivalents." Although both types are legally
defined in the instructions, the problem for defendants is that lay
jurors already have a fixed notion of what is an "equivalent," and have
a tendency to apply that notion of "equivalent," rather than its legal
meaning. Without reminding the jury of the legal definition, counsel
for the defense and the plaintiff, their experts, and the court all find
themselves making short-hand references to the "doctrine of
equivalents" before the jury. This usage tends to reinforce a lay view,
not a legal definition, of what is an "equivalent." By the end of the
trial, the jury is basically aware of a distinction between "literal"
copies and practical "equivalents." The word "doctrine" elevates the
entire concept to a policy level of seemingly historic proportions.
Second, the doctrine of equivalents has usually been defined in
jury instructions in terms of the traditional triple identity test, i.e.,
substantially the same function, same way, and same result. These
three terms are malleable enough to shade into a single lay concept-
as a practical matter, does the accused device "do the same thing?"
From the defense side, then, there is a risk that the jury will migrate
away from the three-prong test toward the simpler question of
whether the accused device "does the same thing." The risk is even
greater where the plaintiff contends, as he or she usually will, that the
accused device solves the same "pre-existing problem" that the
patented invention solved (even if in a different way).18
Third, the foregoing risk (for defendants) is heightened when the
plaintiff is able to make a side-by-side comparison of its commercial
device with the accused device. Of course, the law is clear that such a
comparison is impermissible for infringement purposes." But a
comparison may be permissible when seeking lost profits, at least for
the purpose of showing why sales volume was lost to the infringing
device. This comparison, unfortunately for defendants, also helps the
jury conclude on its own that the competing machines "do the same
thing." This is particularly pernicious for defendants since all
competing machines really "do the same thing." If they did not, they
would not be competing.
18. A good example of this type of confusion is highlighted in Valmont Industries, Inc. v.
Reinke Mfg. Co., Inc., 983 F.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that although the "function" and
"result" prongs had been met, the "way" prong had not been met, and reversing an infringement
judgment).
19. See Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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Before Hilton Davis, Federal Circuit decisions had begun to
impose limits on the doctrine, holding that an equivalent must result
from an "insubstantial change which, from the perspective of one of
ordinary skill in the art, adds nothing of significance to the claimed
invention."' Other decisions had begun to emphasize the "equitable"
origins of the doctrine and imposed thresholds of equity (such as a
showing of purposeful copying) before the doctrine could be applied.21
Hilton Davis, of course, had been anticipated by some
practitioners as the probable coup de grace to the doctrine. The
Federal Circuit framed three questions, all related in some way to the
jury's role in deciding whether an accused device infringes on a patent
under the doctrine of equivalents.' There was, however, no coup de
grace when the decision was announced. The decision, if anything,
grants more discretion to juries. The subtleties of the doctrine favoring
plaintiffs, as described above, have all survived.
The essence of the Hilton Davis holding is this: The touchstone of
the doctrine of equivalents, previously thought to be the triple identity
test, will henceforth be an "insubstantiality of the differences" test.
The triple identity test will still serve to illuminate "insubstantiality of
the differences" and will "often be enough" to assess whether there is
infringement.' Nonetheless, evaluation of "function, way and result"
will not necessarily end the inquiry. As technology becomes yet more
sophisticated, function, way, and result may no longer serve as
exclusive guides.'" Furthermore, the Hilton Davis court held, the test is
to be measured on an objective basis, not on a subjective intent basis, a
distinction that is certain to be problematic. 5
In addition to the triple identities, the other permissible factors
discussed in Hilton Davis included the following:
A. Known Interchangeability. That persons reasonably skilled in
the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient
not contained in the patent with one that was in the patent is "potent"
evidence that one skilled in the art would have considered the change
insubstantial. Such knowledge is measured as of the time of alleged
infringement.
20. Valmont, 983 F.2d at 1043.
21. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
22. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516.
23. Id. at 1518.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1519.
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B. Copying. When an attempt to copy occurs, the factfinder may
infer that the copyist, presumably one skilled in the art, has made a
fair copy with only insubstantial changes. This factor, however, cannot
"dominate" the analysis, for the ultimate question is still the
substantiality of the differences, measured on an objective, not
subjective, basis.
C. Independent Development. This factor is relevant only to rebut
a charge of copying. Independent development is otherwise irrelevant
under the doctrine of equivalents, since subjective intent is irrelevant.
The test is whether, on an objective basis, the accused product is too
close to the patented claim.'
D. Designing Around. In the same way that a plaintiff can attempt
to show copying, the Hilton Davis court held that the defendant may
seek to show that it tried to "design around" the claim. As with
copying, the defendant's intent is supposedly relevant only to the
extent that it reflects an objective standard. That is, someone of
ordinary skill in the art who tries to design around will succeed, while
someone who tries to copy will make a fair copy. Use of this
"defensive" factor requires knowledge of the patent in question. This
eliminates any question of willfulness.
The Hilton Davis court stressed that the standard was objective,
yet the notions of "copying" and "designing around" necessarily
implicate subjective intent. How can these be reconciled? This article
seeks to address this question, as well as the other implications of
Hilton Davis.
II
The Trial Implications of Hilton Davis
A. A Summary of Commentary to Date
The Hilton Davis opinion has already spawned a number of
articles analyzing the opinion and predicting its effect on patent
infringement litigation.' Commentators generally view Hilton Davis
26. Although the court stressed that evidence of independent development is inadmissible
for purposes of the doctrine of equivalents unless copying is charged, willfulness is often charged,
and evidence of independent development is admissible on that score. Id. at 1520.
27. See, e.g., Gary M. Hoffman & Eric Oliver, With Hilton Davis the Federal Circuit Takes
the Doctrine of Equivalents Back to Its Roots, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 763 (1995);
Manny D. Pokotilow, Doctrine of Equivalents a Question for Jury; But Federal Circuit Ruling Still
Gives Court Power, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 13, 1995, at 9; Joseph M. Manakl, Confusion in the Law of
Patent Infringement: The Federal Circuit's Decisions in Markman and Hilton Davis, BIOTECH PAT.
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as a pro-patent decision, because it weds the doctrine of equivalents to
the juryf Moreover, the Hilton Davis decision makes it more difficult
to predict whether a jury will find that an accused product differs only
insubstantially from a patented invention. Arguably, the Graver Tank
"function, way, result" test led to more predictable results. 29
Commentators point out that Hilton Davis ended speculation that
the doctrine of equivalents only applied in exceptional cases. Indeed,
the Federal Circuit held that plaintiffs can argue infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents regardless of the defendant's intent; the
trial judge may not limit the doctrine of equivalents to "equitable"
cases.' Thus, some suggest that the number of cases in which the
doctrine of equivalents is relied upon will increase in the wake of
Hilton Davis.31 As one commentator notes, the doctrine of equivalents
may well become, if it was not already, the "second prong" of every
infringement action.'
Commentators also note that evidence regarding the
"substantiality of the differences" between the claimed invention and
the accused device, in addition to evidence regarding the "function,
way, result" test, will probably be introduced in future patent
infringement jury trials.33 The Federal Circuit made it clear that the
NEWS, Oct. 1, 1995; Jerold A. Jacover, Federal Circuit Puts a New Spin on Doctrine of
Equivalents, CHICAGO LAW, October, 1995, at 75; Eugene M. Gelernter, Patent Infringement
Under Doctrine of Equivalents, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 1995, at 1; Robert C. Scheinfeld, Jury Trials
and the Doctrine of Equivalents, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 8, 1995, at 3; Robert D. Bajefsky, Patent
Equivalency: The Jury Is Still In, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 4, 1995, at 28; Victor G. Savikas & Gregory
A. Castanias, Hilton Davis: What the Federal Circuit Did-and Didn-Decide, NEW MATTER,
Fall, 1995, at 1; William B. Bunker, Close Call: Federal Circuit Revitalizes the Doctrine of
Equivalents as Applied to Patent Infringement Suits, S.F. DAILY J., Oct. 6, 1995, at 5; Henry
Bunsow & Michelle K. Lee, Patent Roles for Judges and Juries, RECORDER, Sept. 20, 1995, at 6;
Dominic Bencivenga, Patent Infringement: Federal Circuit Re-Examines the Role of Jurors,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 14, 1995, at 5; Teresa Riordan, Patents: Substantial Questions Linger After a
Ruling that Could Give Patent Holders More Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at D2; Mark
Walsh, Federal Court Issues Key Patent Ruling on 'Equivalence,'RECORDER, Aug. 11, 1995, at 1.
28. Teresa Riordan, Patents: Substantial Questions Linger After a Ruling that Could Give
Patent Holders More Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at D2.
29. Dominic Bencivenga, Patent Infringement: Federal Circuit Re-Examines the Role of
Jurors, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 14, 1995, at 5.
30. Manny D. Pokotilow, Doctrine of Equivalents a Question for Jury; But Federal Circuit
Ruling Still Gives Court Power, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 13, 1995, at 9; Eugene M. Gelernter, Patent
Infringement Under Doctrine of Equivalents, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 1995, at 1.
31. See Gary M. Hoffman & Eric Oliver, With Hilton Davis the Federal Circuit Takes the
Doctrine of Equivalents Back to Its Roots, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 763, 769 (1995).
32. Gelernter, supra note 30.
33. See Hoffman & Oliver, supra note 31, at 769; Robert C. Scheinfeld, Jury Trials and the
Doctrine of Equivalents, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 8, 1995, at 3.
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"function, way, result" test is not the only test for proving equivalents.
For example, evidence of known interchangeability, copying,
independent development, or designing around was explicitly
identified as relevant for certain purposes in the Hilton Davis
opinion.3 Two such commentators suggest that, in the wake of Hilton
Davis, patent owners should always include a claim for infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents in their pleadings. Moreover, they
should develop evidence supporting infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents' "function, way, result" test, and also should emphasize
in closing argument that literal infringement is only the "starting
point" to an analysis of whether an accused device infringes on a
patent.35
Pretrial discovery in patent infringement cases will also be
modified in response to the Federal Circuit's new explanation of what
evidence is relevant to prove infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. One commentator points out that patent owners will look
harder for evidence of interchangeability and copying, while accused
infringers will want to produce documentation of attempts to design
around patents. 6 Defendants seeking summary judgment will face
greater difficulty because Hilton Davis clarified that infringement is a
question of fact, and that every patent owner is entitled to have this
question determined by a jury. 7
Hilton Davis has not yet been decisive in any district court
opinion, but a few judicial comments are worth noting. One district
judge noted that Hilton Davis holds that "evidence of copying ...is
extremely relevant to an analysis of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalence [sic] without any requirement of proving bad faith."'
Interestingly, this court characterized evidence of copying as
"extremely relevant," because the Hilton Davis court actually states
that evidence of copying shall not "dominate the doctrine of
equivalents analysis. Instead, where the inference arises, it must be
weighed together with other evidence relevant to the substantiality of
34. Joseph M. Manakl, Confusion in the Law of Patent Infringement: The Federal Circuit's
Decisions in Markman and Hilton Davis, BIOTECH PAT. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1995.
35. Henry Bunsow & Michelle K. Lee, Patent Roles for Judges and Juries, RECORDER, Sept.
20, 1995, at 6.
36. William B. Bunker, Close Call: Federal Circuit Revitalizes the Doctrine of Equivalents as
Applied to Patent Infringement Suits, S.F. DAILY J., Oct. 6, 1995, at 5.
37. Bunsow & Lee, supra note 35.
38. General Am. Transp. Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 n.3 (N.D. I11.
1995).
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the differences."'39 In the minds of some judges, however, evidence of
copying will continue to be critical in deciding whether an accused
device infringes under the doctrine of equivalents.
District judges will continue to place some limits on a patent
owner's ability to argue infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents to a jury. In American Permahedge v. Barcana, Inc., the
district court stated that if a patent holder has surrendered the subject
of an alleged infringement under prosecution history estoppel,
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents cannot be argued.'
This doctrine survives Hilton Davis.
One district judge expressed that Hilton Davis does not
significantly expand the availability of a claim for infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents. In Hydraflow v. Enidine, Inc. ,1 the district
judge quoted London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co. 42 for the proposition
that
[a]pplication of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception,
however, not the rule, for if the public comes to believe (or fear)
that the language of patent claims can never be relied on, and that
the doctrine of equivalents is simply the second prong of every
infringement charge, regularly available to extend protection
beyond the scope of the claims, then claims will cease to serve their
intended purpose.43
B. Our Observations
We agree with those commentators who view Hilton Davis as a
pro-patent decision. The decision will not restrict any of the trial
subtleties assisting plaintiffs as outlined above (i.e., the name of the
doctrine, the malleability of the triple factors, and the risks of a side-
by-side comparison). The "substantiality of the differences" test will
create even more wiggle room to find equivalents. Most problematic,
however, is the difficult reconciliation of the subjective-objective
distinction drawn by the court with the "factors" outlined by the court.
1. Consider this example: A patent claims certain analog circuitry.
The defendant "designs around" it, using digital circuitry to carry out
the same function and result. The plaintiff argues "interchangeability,"
contending that engineers know every analog circuit has a digital
39. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519.
40. 901 F. Supp., 155, 160-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
41. 907 F. Supp. 639, 654 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
42. 946 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
43. Hydraflow, 907 F. Supp. at 654 (quoting London, 946 F.2d at 1538).
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"equivalent." Presumably, the plaintiff urges "copying" for the same
reason. The defendant argues that it "designed around" the patent.
Isn't subjective intent necessarily implicated?
2. Anticipating the risk of trial, the defendant in the foregoing
example ought to leave a trail of "design-around" documentation that,
even if self-serving, explains the "substantiality" of the differences
between the analog and digital circuitry. The absence of such a trail
may appear suspicious at trial, especially after the jury is told about
the freedom of competitors to design around a patent using substantial
changes. Over time, we believe that companies will train themselves,
as they may have already done, to do a better job of leaving a trail of
records showing a good-faith attempt to design around. Good faith is
irrelevant legally under Hilton Davis, though trial lawyers know that
such evidence, like evidence of independent development, will have a
favorable impact on the jury.
It is hard to reconcile this scenario with the admonition in Hilton
Davis that subjective intent is irrelevant. Yet, the court itself set this
apparent contradiction in place by stressing the relevance of an
attempt to design around the patent. The difference between
designing around and copying inherently involves subjective evidence.
In theory, Hilton Davis states that both attempts are relevant only to
allow an inference of whether the attempt succeeded, but the line
between subjective and objective intent may be hard to sustain.
3. If a defendant seeks to show that it attempted to "design
around" the patent, can the plaintiff pierce the attorney-client
privilege and obtain counsel's views as to whether or not the design
around would succeed? Hilton Davis suggests not, because the test is
objective rather than subjective. The difficulty, however, is that while
the Hilton Davis court professes an objective test, it employs
inherently subjective concepts.
A related question is whether the defendant may waive the
attorney-client privilege and offer favorable opinions of counsel, i.e.,
that the new design would successfully design around. Presumably the
Hilton Davis holding permits this, if the opinions were part of an effort
to design around. Nonetheless, this approach implies that subjective
belief is relevant. If not, the jury must be instructed that an opinion of
counsel is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible.
4. Under the doctrine now stated, the plaintiff has a difficult
tactical choice to make in whether to assert copying. Such an assertion
would open the door for the defendant to rebut a copying claim with
1996]
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evidence of independent development. Conversely, by not asserting
copying, the plaintiff might keep out any evidence of independent
development, since the defendant will be barred from raising this
factor. This absence of evidence may prejudice the defendant by
leading the jury to believe that the defendant failed to present such
evidence simply because there was no trail of independent
development. To overcome this prejudice, the defendant must seek a
clarifying instruction that such evidence is inadmissible unless a charge
of copying is made. The defendant should diligently pounce upon any
suggestion of copying in the plaintiff's case as an entred for evidence
of independent development. Of course, evidence of independent
development by the defendant may possibly be admissible for other
purposes, such as to show "concurrent development" for purposes of
obviousness or to show lack of willfulness.
5. The plaintiff will usually contend that those of ordinary skill in
the art would have known (at the time of infringement) that the
allegedly distinguishing features were "interchangeable" with those
claimed in the patent. Indeed, the failure to seek or to obtain a patent
on the different features might be viewed as tacit admission that the
differences were not novel or that they were obvious. To avoid this
expansive result, defendants must emphasize and obtain an instruction
that interchangeability is a different concept from novelty, and is
based on an objective standard, not on the idiosyncratic approach
taken by accused manufacturers.
III
Conclusion
The Hilton Davis decision will complicate the law by emphasizing
an objective-subjective distinction that will make trial of doctrine of
equivalents cases more problematic. Hilton Davis leaves untouched
the subtle factors favoring plaintiffs that are inherent in the doctrine.
The doctrine will remain a powerful tool-perhaps too powerful a
tool-for enforcing America's issued patents through the jury system.
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